Ideas from 'Causation' by David Lewis [1973], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Causation' (ed/tr Sosa,E. /Tooley,M.) [OUP 1993,0-19-875094-3]].
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expand these ideas
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
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9476
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If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
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8425
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For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
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8424
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Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
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8420
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A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
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8405
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A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Field,H]
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8427
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I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
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10392
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It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause
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8419
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The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
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8421
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Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
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17525
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The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Bird]
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17524
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Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Bird]
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8397
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Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley]
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8423
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My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations
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8426
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One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
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4795
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Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ]
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